The evidence and analysis in this paper support the earlier findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that sustained increases in domestic savings rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic rates of investment. New estimates for the post-OPEC period 1974-79 imply that each extra dollar of domestic saving increases domestic investment by approximately 85 cents in a sample of 17 OECD countries.
-2-Further, government policies may seek to encourage or prevent capital inflows or outflows during long periods of time. These restrictions on perfect capital mobility imply that national economic policies that affect domestic saving can also influence domestic capital formation.
In an earlier paper, Charles Horioka and I presented a direct test of the perfect capital nbi1ity assumption (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) . We reasoned that with perfect capital mobility there should be no relation between a country's domestic saving rate and its domestic rate of Investment. Instead, a sustained increase in saving in any one country should add funds to the world capital market. These funds would then be divided among countries in a way that depends on the relative size of each country's initial capital stock and the elasticity of its marginal efficiency of capital schedule. it that does not depend on which country did the additional saving.
We used data for the industrial countries that are members of the Organization for Fsonomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to test this implication of perfect capital nxbility. We showed first that there are substantial differences in domestic saving rates among these countries and that these differences remain stable over a long period of time. We then estimated regression equations relating the ratio of danestic investment to gross domestic product as the dependent variable to the ratio of domestic saving to GDP as the Independent variable. To reduce the impact of cyclical variations and random shocks, both variables were averaged over a minimum of five years.
The evidence overwhelmingly rejected the implication of perfect capital mobility. The relation between the investment ratio and the savings ratio is significantly different from zero in every period that we examined at significance levels that were always less than 0.001. Indeed, the coefficients were always greater than 0.85 and thin two standard errors of 1.0. The conclusion was unavoidable that, contrary to the implication of the perfect capital mobility assumption, a sustained increase in the domestic saving ratio caused an almost equal increase in the domestic investment ratio.
The Feldstein-Horioka analysis explicitly assumed that intercountry differences in savings rates are caused by differences in demographic structure, population growth rates and social security retirement income programs. This specification, based on earlier york by Modigliani (1970) and Feldstein (1977) , permitted using a simultaneous equations approach to estimating the investment equation with the savings ratio treated as endogenous. These estimates confirmed the ordinary least squares results.1
The findings of the Feldstein-Horioka study should not however be overinterpreted. They do not imply that there is no capital mobility nor that there is no tendency of capital to shift toward countries where it can earn a high after-tax rate of return.2 Strictly interpreted, the Feldstein-Horioka paper only claims to be a test of the extreme hypothesis of perfect capital mobility. More generally, however, it is reasonable to interpret the Feldstein-Horioka findings as evidence that there are substantial imperfections in the international capital market and that a very large share of domestic savings tends to remain in the home country. This implies further that 1The Feldstein-Horioka paper also reported several other tests that will not be repeated here, e.g., adding variables measuring country size and openness to the investment equation. Section 3 of the present paper returns to the problem of simultaneity.
2Frisch (1981) and Hartman (1981) present some evidence that investment fLows are sensitive to after-tax rates of return. _14_ sustained government deficits do reduce domestic capital formation and that corporate income taxes can reduce the net return to capital.3 The Feldstein-Horioka study used data for the fifteen year period from 1960 through 1971k. The sample period ended just as the dramatic 1973 OPEC price increase had begun to alter substantially the current account deficits of the industrial nations and therefore the international flow of capital. Government interference with international capital movements was also reduced in some countries in the 1970s; the United States, for example, ended its interest equalization tax on foreign borrowing in the United States in 197I and reduced the pressure on U.S. nultinationals to finance overseas investment by borrowing abroad.
One major purpose of the present study is to extend the sample period to the end of the 1970s. The evidence presented in section 1 confirms that the second half of the 1970s was a period of substantially greater international capital flows. Nevertheless, the earlier finding that international differences in saving rates are associated with nearly equal differences in investment rates interpret Harberger (1980) as essentially accepting this interpretation. In an earlier paper (Harberger, 1978) , he argued that international capital markets were essentially perfect and therefore that rates of return are equalized internationally just as "water seeks its own level." But by his 1980 paper, Harberger concludes: "My own intuition does not want to accept the notion that increments of investment activity are in all or nearly all countries effectively 100 percent "financed" by funds flowing in from abroad, and that increments in saving simply spill out into the world capital markets. I find the analor to a hydraulic system with perhaps a viscous fluid, in which the pipes are partially clogged, and in which some vessels are separated by semipermeable membranes, to be nore consonant with imj image of the world than the alternative analog to a hydraulic system where the water flows freely through the system and, essentially instantaneously, finds the same level everywhere." (p.. 336) .
If that flow is slow enough, so that the tendency toward equalization imist be measured in decades rather than months or even years, any relevant analysis zaist regard the capital novements as incomplete and rates of return as potentially unequal.
-5-is reconfirmed. There is no more support for the perfect capital mobility hypothesis in the regression estimates for l974 through 1919 than there was in the previous fifteen years.
Since net foreign investment is equal to the difference between domestic savings arid domestic investment, the strong association between domestic investment and domestic savings iniplies that there is only a weak association between net foreign investment and domestic savings. The empirical analysis presented in section 2 decomposes net foreign investment and examines the relation between each of the major components of net foreign investment and the domestic saving rate. A different type of decomposition is suggested by the essential equality of net foreign investment and the current account surplus.
Section 2 also examines the relation between the components of the current account balance and the domestic saving rate. Neither of these analyses suggests any change in the basic conclusion about the long-run independence of international capital flows from domestic savings rates.
Since domestic savings and domestic investment are parts of an interdependent economic system, the regression of investment ratios on savings ratios raises problems of estimation and interpretation. Section 3 discusses the issues of identification and estimation with the help of a minimal theoretical model of investment, savings and international capital flows. The analysis indicates why cross-country data averaged over substantial periods are likely to be a much nxre reliable basis for testing the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility and for estimating structural paranenters than time series data for individual countries.
Section 1 then examines an explicit idel of portfolio choice that shows why sustained changes in domestic savings may have only a small effect on -6-. net foreign investment in the long run and yet may also have a more substantial effect on capital flows in the short run.
There is a brief concluding section that comments on some of the limitations of the current paper and that suggests direction for future research.
The Effect of Saving on Domestic Investment
The basic data for the present analysis are the ratios of investment to GDP and savings to GDP for 17 OECD countries.
These ratios are calculated using the current dollar magnitudes published by the OECD (1981) and therefore adjusted by the OECD to a common set of statistical definitions. Table 1 presents the values of the saving and investment ratios and of the differences between them. All of the figures refer to gross investment and saving. The first three columns show the ian values of these ratios for each country in the 15 year period from 1960 through l97. The comparable ratios for the post-OPEC years 1975 through 1979 are shown in the next three columns.
These figures show a striking increase in the absolute differences between the domestic savings rate and the domestic investment rate. In the fifteen years ending in 197k, the difference between the average savings ratio and the average investment ratio ranged from -0.030 (in Greece) to 0.018 (in the Netherlands) with a mean of 0.007 and a standard deviation of 0.016. In contrast, in the second half of the 1970s the range was from _O.012 (in Finland)
The other seven OECD countries had to be excluded from the sample because consistent data are not available for the entire period. 5'rhese ratios differ from the ratios presented in Table 1 of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) only because of data revisions. Source: "National Accounts of the OECD Countries: 1950 -1979 , OECD, 1981 SLY is gross domestic savings divided by GDP.
i/Y is gross domestic investment divided by GDP.
-8to 0.0514 (in the Netherlands) with a ian of -o.oi6 and a standard deviation of 0.025.
For virtually every industrial country, the second half of the l9TOs
represented a time when domestic investment exceeded domestic savings. This In turn implied that net foreign investment was negative and therefore that the current account was in deficit. The negative net foreign Investment for the industrial countries as a whole in these years was largely a reflection of the higher prices being paid for imported oil and the resulting surpluses of the OPEC countries.
Despite the substantial increase in the size and variability of international capital flows, the second half of the l9TOs showed the same strong tendency for countries with high domestic savings rates to have high rates of domestic investment. The estimate for the second halt of the 1970s indicates that an additional "dollar" (pound, franc, mark, etc) of domestic saving raised domestic -9investment by 0.865 dollars with a standard error of 0.185.6 Comparison with the other subperiods indicates that the response of investment to savings was at least as high in this final period as in any of the earlier periods. This was -2 true even though, as the lower B implies, there was more "unpredictable" variation in domestic investment during this period.7
For the 20 year period as a whole, each extra "dollar" of saving was associated with 0.796 additional dollars of investment. With a standard error of 0.112, this is clearly significantly different from zero at any relevant probability level. The alternative null hypothesis, i.e., that the coefficient of SlY is 1.0, can be rejected at a probability level of 10 percent, implying that capital does tend to flow to countries with low savings rates although certainly much less than perfect capital mobility would imply.
The first five equations reported in Table 2 refer to gross saving and gross investment. Since capital accumulation depends on net investment, it is interesting to consider also the relation between net investment and net saving.
Since this requires subtracting an estimate of depreciation from both variables, any error in measuring depreciation will tend to bias the estimated coefficient toward one. This potential bias is consistent with the result presented in the sixth equation of Table 2 that shows a coefficient of 0.99 for the regression of the net investment ratio on the net savings rate.
.
If the equation is estimated in level form rather than ratio form, the coefficient is very close to one but this reflects the pure scale effect. Only ratio equations are therefore presented in this paper.
TThese differences in domestic investment reflected such things as differences in the response of profitability and of capacity utilization to the 1973 OPEC shock and to the rising rates of inflation. The coefficients refer to equation 1 in the text. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. The "gross" equations relate gross investment and saving while the "net" equation relates net investment and saving.
If there were no problems of measuring savings, investment and international transactions, the difference between gross domestic savings and gross domestic investment would be equal to the balance on current account (CA). This suggests that, instead of using the conventional national income account measure of domestic savings, the value of gross domestic savings could be defined as the 8 sum of gross domestic investment and the current account balance: S = I + CA.
The basic equation is reestimated for the decade of the 1970s with this derived measure of savings and presented in the final line of Table 2 . The coefficient of 0.886 is only slightly higher than the previous estimate of 0.8143 for this decade and show that this source of measurement error does not influence the basic result.
The estimation of equation 1 with a cross section of country averages implicitly assumes that each country's disturbance is purely random and uncorrelated with the savings ratio. If country investment rates do differ systematically for some reason that is not directly related to the savings ratio, equation 1 should be replaced by an equation in which the constant term is allowed to differ among countries:
If equation 2 is the correct specification but equation 1 is estimated, the coefficient of will be biased if is correlated with the savings ratio.
This potential source of bias can be eliminated by extending the analysis to two observations for each country so that the constant values of the 8This is the procedure used by Sachs (198la) .
Defining the latter period as 1973 through 1979 (i.e., the years affected by the OPEC price shock) and the earlier period as the previous seven "pre-OPEC" years implies an estimate of of 1.0214 with a standard error of 0.227 and an estimate of 6 of 0.013 with a standard error of 0.005. The for this equation is 0.55. Thus countries that increased their saving between the earlier period and the later period found that their investment increased on average by an equal amount between the two dates. There is certainly no support in this estimate for the view that increases in saving merely augmented the total world supply of funds and that such capital was allocated among countries in unconstrained pur-10 suit of the highest rate of return.
An alternative method of estimating equation 2 is to use each of the annual observations in a pooled cross-section of time series. Using data for the entire 20 year period11 implies an estimate of 0.771 for with a standard 9Although the uj'S are eliminated by first differencing in this way, they can be estimated in a second step once and iS are estimated. The procedure is exactly equivalent to estimations with individual constant terms and two observations for each country.
10The use of differences in saving and investment ratios may cause sinultaneous equations bias that is not present in the estimates of Table 2 . This is discussed in section 3. Some individual annual observations are missing, reducing the sample to 320 observations. error of 0.0146, very similar to the estimate of 0.796 shown in ble 2 and obtained when the annual data are averaged to produce a single value for each country.
The similarity of the estimates with individual constant terms and with averaged data suggests that including the individual constant terms has little effect on the estimate of 8. This is confirmed when equation 1 is The negative coefficient of the lagged savings variable suggests that investment does not adjust to savings gradually but overadjusts at first. The coefficients of further lagged values are smaller and not statistically significant.
Finally, using the annual observations to estimate the average effect of year to
year changes in saving among all countries indicates that:
'it -
60 -1 4-Thus, even year to year increases in saving tend on average to be associated with increases in domestic investment in the saving country by approximately 12 equal amounts.
Domestic Savings and the Components of International Capital Flows
The basic investment equation can be rewritten in terms of net foreign investment and then used to analyze the relation between saving and the com- 
The implied value of is 0.908 and therefore slightly higher than the estimate presented in value as large as 0.1 and none was as large as its standard error. The lack of a significant relationship between the current account balance and savings reflects a lack of relation between each of its components and savings.
In short, the two decompositions that have been examined confirm the finding of section 1 that there is no relation between sustained differences in domestic savings rates and the external position of the country.
Parameter Identification and Estimation with Cross-Country and Time Series Data
The regression of the domestic Investment ratio on the domestic savings ratio is an intuitively appealing test of the hypothesis of perfect 
provides that the supply of saving is a nondecreasing function of the real interest rate (ip' 0) plus a random shock.
Writing N for net foreign investment (i.e., the net outflow of capital from the home country), the net capital outflow in response to a higher interest rate can be 'written:
where ' (r) 0 implies that a higher real domestic interest rate reduces (or leaves unchanged if n' = 0) net foreign investment (or causes a greater net inflow from abroad, i.e., a negative net foreign investment) and e is a random shock. Perfect capital mobility implies that n' = -. More generally, r' could differ between the short-run and the long-run and could vary among countries or time periods. Some reasons for such differences are discussed below.
Equilibrium in the goods rket requires that domestic saving equal domestic investment plus net foreign investment:1T S=I+N (12) These four equations determine values for the four endogenous variables I, S, N and r as functions of the three random distributions u, v and e.
Substituting 9, 10 and 11 in 12 yields:
1T1 a simple theoretical model, this is equivalent to the equilibrium condition S = I + X -M where X is exports and M is imports since net foreign investment equals the current account surplus.
Since ' ) 0, 4,' < 0 and n' 0, the denominator is unambiguously positive.
Thus the interest rate rises when there is a positive shock to domestic investment demand (du > 0) or to the domestic demand for net foreign investment (de > 0).
The effect of investment and savings shocks on net foreign investment can be obtained by combining equations 11 and 14:
To interpret equation 15, recall that dN > 0 means an increased capital outflow and that n' ( 0. Thus an increase in domestic savings (dv > 0) causes an increase in net foreign investment and therefore both a capital outflow and a current account surplus. With perfect capital mobility, n' = -and dN/dv = 1;
in this case, all of the additional domestic saving goes abroad. Similarly, even with a finite value of n', an increase in domestic investment (du > 0) causes a decrease in net foreign investment and therefore both a capital inflow and a current account deficit.
This brief description of the international effects of shifts in domestic savings and investment has ignored the exchange rate novments that are likely to occur as part of the process of change. An autonomous increase in l8Thj$ is the case discussed by Sachs (l981a, 1981b) . I will return to his empirical results later in this section. domestic investment demand (or decrease in savings) will raise the domestic interest rate and cause a real appreciation of the home currency. With this increase in the exchange rate there is a current account deficit that accomodates the capital inflow. The model is consistent with this exchange rate behavior even though the exchange rate is not explicitly modelled. If 4" is "small" relative to -4)', i.e., if the interest elasticity of savings is small relative to the interest elasticity of investment, dI/dv will be close to 1. Now that the theoretical relation between domestic saving and investment has been clarified it is possible to examine more explicitly the interpretation of the regression coefficient estimated by regressing the investment ratio on the savings ratio, i.e., the coefficient of equation 1 estimated to be approximately one in the cross-country regressions reported in Table 2 Similarly, combining equations 16 and 19 yields an approximation for the covariance between S and I: shifts is thus likely to be smaller than the intercountry variance in exogenous saving shifts (atr < a) and the covariance between the two is likely to be small or zero. If there is a nonzero covariance, there appears to be no presumption about its sign.
'9Feldstein and Horioka estimated time-series regressions for individual countries and presented the results in NBER Working Paper No. 310 but did not include these time series estimates in the published version (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980) because we concluded that the problem of simultaneous equations bas meant that these individual country coefficients could not be interpreted as estimates of the effect on investment of exogenous changes in saving.
-2L-Equation 23 shows that the estimated values of 8 presented in Table 2 are not consistent with perfect capital mobility if is zero or negative.
Moreover, even if there is a positive covariance between exogenous savings dif- it is easily shown that with perfect capital mobility the correlation between savings and investment is the same as the correlation between u and perfect capital mobility, the regression of saving on investment produces a coefficient equal to =°' %• Multiply this by = ouv/avv from equation 23 and note that BIsBsI = uv/0uu0 = 2uv' t the product of a regression coefficient and the coefficient for the reverse regression is equal to the squared correlation; i.e., Bis8si = is' Thus P218 = The observed correlations between saving and investment (i.e., the square root of the R2 values reported in Table 2 ) imply implausibily high correlations between the exogenous components of saving and investment.
In short, the identifying restriction in cross-country data that uv 0 or that is small is sufficient to permit interpreting the observed regressions of investment on savings presented in Table 2 as strong evidence against perfect capital mobility. Alternatively, the restriction that the correlation between exogenous saving and investment differences is not greater than 0.5 also implies rejection of the perfect capital nobility hypothesis. Although these assumptions may not hold exactly, they may be a reasonable approximation for cross-country data based on averages over extended periods. In this context, the interest elasticities of domestic investment may be high relative to the interest elasticity of domestic savings. Similarly, the variance of domestic savings may be large relative to the covariance between exogenous savings differences and exogenous differences in investment and net foreign capital. The value of B in equation 22 tends to dI/dv as and ave/ayy all tend to zero.
Estimates
An alternative specification places no restriction on the interest sensitivity of domestic savings but posits that the exogenous differences among 22The assumptions of 4i' = 0 and ave = a = 0 make the model recursive with respect to S and therefore makes ordinary least squares an unbiased estimator.
-27countries in saving rates are large relative to the exogenous differences in domestic and foreign investment: thus and aee/v are both small and therefore auvla.vy, cevovy and uevv are also small. Taking the limit as a, grows relative to the other variances and covariances implies that 8 tends to 4'/(+n'). Since the true value of dI/dv is $'/(q'+n'-ip), the estimate overstates the true value. More specifically, the ratio of the sample estimate Most empirical research indicates that this ratio is low and therefore that the relative bias in 8 is small.
The Regression of Savings on Investment
In an interesting pair of papers, Jeffrey Sachs (1981a Sachs ( , 1981b emphasized the response of international capital flows to temporary shifts in domestic propensities to invest. Sachs showed that countries that increased their share of investment in GD? between 1968-73 and 19714_T9 also experienced substantial increases in net capital inflows, i.e., substantial decreases in net foreign investment. As a leading example of this, Sachs pointed to the major flow of capital into Norway that accompanied the Norwegian investment boom caused by Norway's discovery of North Sea oil.
Equation 26 , 1980) . Nevertheless, there is also the alternative possibility that the regression coefficient for this brief period provides a biased estimate of dS/du because of a temporary covariance among the "exogenous" saving and investment factors during this unusual period. Only further time will tell. It is clear, however, that for the previous fifteen years, the regressions of SLY on I/Y as yell as the regressions of' I/Y on S/Y support the conclusion that higher levels of domestic investment do not induce foreign capital inflows but can only be financed by domestic saving.
Portfolio Adjustment and Capital Flows in the Long Run and the Short Run
The analysis of section 3 indicates that the regression estimates are more relevant as a guide to the long-run response of international capital xvements to changes in domestic savings and investment than to their short-run response. Coefficient estimates based on annual variations in savings and investment are subject to potentially severe simultaneous eq.uatiOn bias that is not present when annual observations are averaged over a decade or more and the regression is estimated with a cross-country sample of these averages. The empirical estimates based on such data that were presented in sections 1 and 2 imply that, for the 1960s and 1970s as a whole, higher savings rates induce higher rates of domestic investment but virtually no increase in net foreign investment.
The behavior of capital flows in the short run may be quite different.
Although the empirical analysis of sections 1 and 2 is not directly relevant, theoretical considerations suggest that the short-run response of international capital flows to changes in domestic saving may be much greater than the longrun response. The essential reason for this is that the short-run capital flow is part of a once-for-all adjustment of the international portfolio. When the adjustment is complete, the rate of capital flow returns to a lower level governed by the rate of growth of the world capital stock and the share of international assets in the equilibrium portfolio. 26
To make these ideas nxre precise, consider an investor who divides his portfolio between domestic and foreign assets. Domestic assets earn an uncertain return, r, with subjective mean i and subjective variance a00. Foreign assets earn an uncertain return, r*, with subjective mean ji and variance
The covariance between the returns is a. If the investor's preferences can be summarized by a utility function that is a quadratic function of the portfolio return, the investor well maximize
26Although early models of Mundell (1968) and others id not distinguish between the adjustment phase and the steady state flow, the importance of distinguishing a temporary capital flow as part of a once-for-all capital stock adjustment has been recognized at least since Branson (1970) . See also Branson (1979) , Cumby and Obstfeld (1982) , Girton and Henderson (1977) arid Obstfeld (1981) .
invested abroad, and y > 0 is a asure of risk aversion.
The first order maximization conditions implies that the optimal proportion invested abroad (*) is:
the denominator is y times the variance of r_r* and is therefore unambiguously positive. The numerator is easier to discuss if we replace a by pAa00 where p is the correlation between r and r* and = the ratio of the foreign variance to the domestic variance. Thus --y( pA -i)
It is clear that even if the foreign expected return exceeds the domestic return (ij* > t), the investor may not wish to invest abroad, i.e., p* Q This can happen only if (1) there is a positive correlation between domestic and foreign rates of return (reflecting, for example, the international business cycle or common long-term trends in productivity and profitability) and
(2) the subjective variance on the foreign return exceeds the subjective variance on the domestic return. The subjective variance on the foreign return may be very large because investors lack information about the foreign econonw, its individual firms, accounting practices, etc.27 If p < 0, the investor may 27A recent story in the Wall Street Journal reporting from ¶Lkyo summarized the difficulty that foreign investors have in getting information on Japanese securities: "A foreigner here once asked a Japanese securities salesman where to get investment advice, and this is what he was told: " 'We have a saying: the better the English, the worse the analysis," (Marconi, 1982 A sustained increase in the domestic saving rate raises capital intensity at home and thereby depresses the expected rate of return, ii. This unambiguously raises p", implying that some of the additional capital should be invested abroad.28 If the initial p is negative, however, the increase in p may still leave the actual p at a constrained corner solution of p = 0. In this case, domestic investors do not seek to transfer any of the additional saving abroad. The increased domestic saving may nevertheless lead to an increase in net foreign investment if foreign investors respond to the lower expected return by reducing their overseas investment. In terms of equation 29, from the point of view of foreign investors iJ has fallen, causing an unambiguous reduction in p". Again, however, if foreign investors were originally not investing abroad, the reduction in the expected return would have no effect.
Thus portfolio considerations alone could explain why a change in domestic saving in one country would have no effect on its net foreign investment.
28m. is unambiguous only because I assume that the increase in domestic capital has no effect on the variance of the return or the risk aversion parameter.
Ignoring the possibility of corner solutions, a sustained exogenous increase in domestic saving will, by reducing the expected domestic rate of return, raise p' and cause a capital outflow. This will be reinforced by foreign investors who respond to the lower expected return by reducing their overseas investment. The response of p' to the change in i is inversely proportional to y(a + -2o). The greater the risk aversion (y) or the uncertainty about domestic and foreign rates of return (a and ), the smaller will be the change in p. Thus, even for countries that do have overseas portfolio investments, the effect of a change in the expected return on domestic or foreign investment may be a relatively small change in the optimal allocation of assets between home and abroad.
It is useful, however, to divide the response of international investment into two coonents. rst, a sustained increase in the domestic saving rate alters i*p and therefore changes p* for both domestic and foreign investors. There is then a relatively brief period during which portfolios are readjusted to the new optimal mix.3° During this readjustment there is a relatively large increase in the rate of net foreign investment. The shorter the time period during which the adjustment occurs, the greater will be the rate of net foreign investment per unit of time. Once the adjustment is complete, p remains unchanged. As the national capital stocks at home and abroad grow over time with the economies, the fraction p will flow abroad. Net foreign investment during this steady state growth will be the difference between the steady 29liartman (1980) presents evidence that international capital flows are large enough to affect rates of return on U.S. securities but not enough to equalize returns here and abroad.
30Although such a reallocation should in principle occur instantly, institutional reasons may cause the adjustment to take a year or niDre.
-35state outflow of funds by domestic investment and the steady state inflow of funds from foreign investors. Although the evidence of sections 1 and 2 indicates that this long-run response to a sustained shift in domestic saving is quite small, the short-run response during a brief period of transition could be quite sustained.
Concluding Comments
The evidence and analysis in this paper support the earlier findings of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that sustained increases in domestic savings rates induce approximately equal increases in domestic investment rates.
Although this limited extent of international capital nobility is consistent with the portfolio model developed in section 1, there are clearly other aspects of both international portfolio investment and international direct investment that should be taken into account in explaining the observed mobility.
Government policies establish the framework for private international investing. Governments of OECD countries have sought to restrict both capital inflows and capital outflows, including both direct and portfolio investment.
Even the United States, perhaps the most liberal of the OECD countries in its attitude to capital nvements, restricts the class of institutions that can invest abroad and thereby reduces the total volume and sensitivity of foreign investment. It would be useful to examine the capital restriction policies in detail, to evaluate their effectiveness and to understand the reasons ihy governments nay choose to restrict international capital movements.31 310ne such reason, the ability of foreign governments' to capture the tax revenue of foreign investment, is discussed in Feldstein (1982) .
